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STRATEGIES FOR INFORhfATION DEVELOPPENT 
AND UTILIZATION FOR TOXIC CHEMICALS 
Mark Sharefhn 
1. INTRODUCI'ION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1. Characteristics of the Problem 
In the last five years, several countries have expanded and 
strengthened their arrangements for regulating existing chemicals, and 
for controlling the introduction into commerce of new chemicals. One 
simple, uncontroversial fact has led many to believe that those controls 
are necessary: the natural environment is now contaminated with many 
synthetic organic chemicals, some of which are believed to be carcino- 
gens, mutagens. teratogens. or several of the above.' Technological 
' ~ r e ~ a r z o n  of this document was supported in part by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation 
and in part by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis largely through fund- 
ing by the Bundesrninisterium fiir Forschung und Technologie; FRG. 
2 ~ h e  trihdomethanes, produced as byproducts in the chlorination step of drinking purifica- 
tion, are ubiquitous in American surface water; so are many common organic solvents, Like 
trichlorethelyne. Unfortunately, the same is true of much American groundwater, as we 
progress in organic analysis over the last three decades has been so rapid 
that relatively quick and inexpensive identification of such contaminants 
a t  parts per billion concentrations is now possible. A one cubic centime- 
ter  sample of drinking water can be processed, essentially instantane- 
ously, into a computer listing of synthetic organic contaminants. 
So much is now uncontroversial, but controversy begins with 
interpretation, and with the subsequent policy proposals. The broad 
range of positions already occupied can be demarcated by noting the 
extremes. At one such extreme are  advocates of benign, if cautious, 
neglect. Th s  argument runs: there is no clear evidence that  age- 
adjusted rates of cancer incidence or mortality have increased with the 
expansion of, production of, and commerce in synthetic organic chemi- 
c a l ~ . ~  The implication generally drawn, that  no radical changes in 
current toxic chemicals management policy are warranted, is immediate. 
A t  the other extreme are warnings of potential d i ~ a s t e r . ~  The latency 
period for cancer induction, this argument runs, is typically in the order 
of decades. Thus, the consequences of the enormous post-World War 11 
increase in synthetic organic chemicals production and commerce, and 
in the  implied human exposures, have not yet appeared in cancer 
incidence and mortality rates. Continuing, if all dose-response relation- 
s h p s  are linear, existing measurements of synthetic organic chemical 
have learned from the survey work of the United States Geological Survey. A much more sys 
tematic understanhng of the dimensions of the problem will soon be possible, thanks in part 
t o  the data gathering requirements of the Lnterim Primary D r h n g  Water Regulations of the 
Safe Drinking Water Act. 
3 ~ e e ,  for example, Sir Richard Doll (1977). 
4 ~ e e ,  for example, R.H. Harris, e t  al. (1977) 
pollutant concentrations in drlnk~ng water and food can, in cornbinatlon 
with potency estimates, be used to forecast future cancer incidence and 
mortality rates. Some forecasts constructed in this way imply signifi- 
cantly hlgher future cancer incidence rates. The policy implication gen- 
erally drawn: stronger control efforts should put in place "with deliberate 
speed" are  warranted. 
Given what we know now, neither of two extreme positions can be 
confidently rejected. For that reason, toxic chemicals management 
poses a dilemma for public policy. That dilemma remains even if we ask 
what would be good policy in a world in whlch we knew with certainty that  
the second (or "pessimistic") extreme view was correct--for special 
characteristics of the toxic chemicals problems make design of a good 
management strategy particularly difficult. 
Three of those special characteristics should be kept in mind in 
everythng that  follows. The first is the "large numbers problem". There 
are  a great  many chemicals, and thus many potentially hazardous ones. 
The relevant information about those chemicals is widely dispersed 
among final users, distributors, and manufacturers and their employees. 
Second, there are several very different ways of buying additional infor- 
mation about particular chemicals; those alternatives differ in cost, and 
in the character and quality of the information they yield. This might be 
called "many alternative tests." Third is the "testing budget constraint" 
characteristic. The number of potentially hazardous chemicals is so 
large, and some test alternatives so expensive, that  exhaustive testing-- 
subjecting chemicals to all conceivably warranted tests--is economically 
impossible. Let us take up each of these characteristics briefly and in 
turn; later we will have to look more carefully and analytically at  each 
1.1.1. The large numbers problem 
That there are a great many potentially troublesome chemicals is by 
now widely appreciated. Though the use of such numbers is inevitably 
open to misinterpretation, the listing of existing chemicals in American 
commerce, the "inventory" prepared by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). is about 55.000 chemicals long.5 The number of 
new chemicals entering into commerce in the United States in any given 
year may be as high as several hundred to one thousand. 
Compilation of the  "inventory" of existing chemicals was a monumen- 
tal task, in par t  for reasons already noted. Information on chemicals is 
widely dispersed among final users, distributors, and manufacturers and 
their employees. The seriousness of t h s  problem can be illustrated by 
the difficulty of assembling information on current levels of occupational 
and general population exposures to a particular chemicaL6 Exposure 
estimates are critical to health effect estimates. The crudest measure of 
health impact is simply the product of exposure and potency reasonably 
accurate estimates of potency can be obtained from laboratory tests. 
Though extrapolation from laboratory test to humans remains con- 
tentious, those tests do provide some quantitative measures of potency. 
But where is exposure data to be gotten? Suppose, for example, that  the  
'office of Pesticides and Toxic Substance, United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
1878 Toxic Substances Control Act Chemical Substance Inventory, Initial Inventory. 
'see, for example, the selection of information required of reporting firms by United States 
Environmental Protection Agency proposed form, Premanufacture Notice, Part 11, Human Ex- 
posure and Environmental Release, Federal Register, Vol. 44, No. 201, October 16, 1979. The 
difficulties of accurately estimating human exposures from the requested information are 
apparent. 
chemical in question first sees the light of day in the production are& of 
some chemical manufacturing plant. Initial human exposures to that  
chemical are then exposures of plant personnel. But occupational expo- 
sures, whch  are  typically easier and less costly to measure than general 
population exposures, are difficult to measure and have been estimated 
for very few chemicals. Any such measurement requires excellent 
knowledge of the particular process, and perhaps even of the particular 
plant configuration; such knowledge will typically be held only by plant 
employees and management. The same point can be made for many, if 
not most, of the other kinds of information that  are germane to toxic 
chemicals management. Information on health and environmental 
effects, no less than information on production processes and occupa- 
tional exposures is dispersed among many institutions and individuals. 7 
At least some of those institutions and individuals have "more and better" 
information than can be "centralized"--delivered to some government 
agency charged with toxic chemicals management policy. 
1.1.2. The many alternative tests "problem" 
Suppose, nevertheless, that some such agency does decide to gather 
information on some particular chemical. There will be no lack of possi- 
ble ways in which to expend that  agency's scarce resources. First, the 
scientific literature can be searched for reported work on the chemical in 
question, or on chemicals thought to be closely related in chemical struc- 
ture, and thus perhaps in biological activity.' Calculating "simple 
  or the diversity of sources of hformation on the environmental effects of, and the per- 
sistence of, candidate toxic chemicals, see the first report of the American Interagency Test- 
ing Committee (1977). !t is almost certain that the available information varies widely in 
quality. 
correlations" of the structure of the chemical under investigation (with 
structural indicators of other chemicals) is inexpensive, but interpreting 
the results is difficult. Second, a growing arsenal of so-called short-term, 
or bacterial tests,  is available9 Those tests can typically be run in a day. 
and a t  a cost of about $500 to $1,000. Third, there is the traditional last 
resort: long-term, or animal bioassay. testing.l0 Those long-term tests 
can extend over several years and can cost on the order of $1,000,000. 
1.1.3. The budget constraint problem 
Looking over all of these possible ways of purchasing additional infor- 
mation on a particular chemical, the government agency may notice that 
each test provides imperfect information of a particular kind, and a t  
some specified cost. The costs for the most expensive tests  are  h g h  
enough to rule out exhaustive testing of all chemicals; here as  elsewhere 
cholces must be made.'' But those choices can be made rationally only 
if we know what we expect to learn from the  purchased information and 
what we will do with that  information. 
'The chemical literature is, to  say the least, voluminous; it is almost certainly true that the 
quality of the best published results has improved radically, along with instrumenta+.ion and 
quaBtp control methods, over the past two decades or so. 
qu or a relatively nontechnical discussion of the variety of short-term tests currently avail- 
able, see Raymond Devoret (1979); the original article is Ames, McCann, and Yarnasaki (1975). 
'O~or  a descnption of one of the largest and most ambitious programs of long-term testing, 
see, for example, the summary reports of the Carcinogenesis Bioassay Program, conducted 
by the National Cancer Institute of Lhe Umted States National hs t i tu tes  of Health. 
''In ~e years 1977 through 1980, the testing budget of the Office of Pesticides and Toxic 
Substances probably was on the order of $20 rniliion. But h s  is not a very useful g u d e  to 
the resources currently evended  on testing in the United States, because considerable 
resources are available to both other government agencies like the National Institutes of 
Health and to the private sector for these purposes. Further, many other countries, and 
some major international organizations Bke the United Nations, have programs of their own. 
Assembling information on these programs in s0rr.e useful form would be helpful not only to 
us, but clearly to anyone involved in the forward ?laming of testing and regulatory pro- 
grams. Whde t h s  exercise probably would not be very difficult, it might well be tedious. 
What do we learn from this listing of characteristics? One thing we 
learn is that it is too early to pick one or another institutional setting of 
framework as  the way in whlch to analyze the toxics management prob- 
lem. We know too little about the "distribution" of existing information, 
and about the costs of generating and transferring new information, to be 
dogmatic. We believe that the difficulties encountered by the American 
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) implementation effort reinforce both 
these points. 12 
1.2. Implementation Efforts: Lessons from the American Experience 
Efforts to design and implement toxic chemicals management poli- 
cies have led to somewhat different results in the many countries con- 
cerned with the problem. Nevertheless, because the underlying problem 
is the same, there are some similarities across national programs. For 
tha t  reason, observations based narrowly upon the American experience 
may be more generally applicable. 
The American Congress enacted the Toxic Substance Control Act 
(TSCA) in 1976.13 The executive branch agency charged with implement- 
ing that legislative mandate, the Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances 
(OPTS) of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is 
now four years old. Though judgments of administrative performance in a 
problem as novel and as complicated as the toxic chemicals problem 
should be tempered with mercy, many observers have been less than 
"~orne  of these issues are discussed in a monograph, in progress s t  Resources for the Fu- 
ture,  on the TSCA implementation experience. 
13~oxic  Substance Control Act, Public Law 84-468, 84th Congress of the  United States, Oc- 
tober 11, 1076. Also see the legislative history of the Act. 
merciful. The agency, and the program, are seen by many as havlng 
failed to ~dentlfy, justify, pursue and defend an  implementation stra- 
tegy. l4 
Such judgments often rest upon some simple summary statistics of 
agency performance and upon projections of what continuation of present 
performance will mean. In 1979, the OPTS issued its listing, or "inven- 
tory," of existing chemicals. That listing was required by the logic of 
TSCA. Because TSCA treats  existing and new chemicals asymmetrically, 
as any workable toxic chemicals management must, an  inventory of exist- 
ing chemicals is needed to mark the boundary between "existing" and 
"new" chemicals. The American inventory lists approximately 55,000 
chemicals in commerce. 
By comparison, about 100 existing chemicals have thus far been 
identified as  candidates for scrutiny and possible restriction.15 Com- 
parison of these small numbers to the large number of entries in the 
inventory is inevitably simplistic, but may not be misleading. The percep- 
tion that present methods for defining a management strategy for exist- 
ing chemicals are hopelessly cumbersome may be accurate. 
The new chemicals management problem is substantially different 
than the existing chemicals management problem. The practical alterna- 
''The US General Accounting Office, the accounting and inspection arm of the  United States 
Congress, has just completed an extensive and very critical analysis of TSCA implementation. 
A less de t i l ed  critique is to be found in the briefs filed by the Natural Resources Defense 
Council in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. vs. Douglas Costle, Administrator and Un- 
ited States Environmental Protection Agency, United States District Court, Southern District 
of New York, 79 Civ. 2411, July 11, 1979. 
150ne measure of the number of chemicals thus far selected for serious attention is the 
number of chemicals listed by the Interagency Testing Committee. Other plausible measures 
support same order of magnitude estimate, about 100. 
tives for management of a new chemical are much broader than the alter- 
natives for managing an  exlstlng chemical. A new chemical can, In princi- 
ple, be tested extensively before lntroductlon into commerce. Concern 
over the rate--between several hundred and one thousand per year--at 
which new chemicals were being introduced in use and commerce was in 
fact largely responsible for passage of TSCA by the American Congress. 16 
Nevertheless, OPTS performance in processing applications by pros- 
pective importers and manufacturers to introduce new chemicals has yet 
to be tested by serious cases. Of several hundred such applications 
received, more than eighty percent were for either polymers or inter- 
mediate chemicals: polymers are unlikely to pose any serious health or 
environmental risk, and intermediate chemicals are unlikely to be 
released to the environment in substantial quantities17 The OPTS appli- 
cation process and requirement fails to focus information generating 
effort on those chemicals w h c h  really are candidate problems, but 
instead diffuses it over many that  almost certainly are not. In each year 
since the passage of TSCA, several hundred applications to introduce new 
chemicals have been submitted to OPTS. Less than 50 such applications 
have been processed, with about 10 chemicals barred from introduction. 
Again, many have found the OPTS performance in desigrung and imple- 
ment~ng  a strategy for new chemicals management wanting. 
"see United States Congress (1976). 
I71t is widely believed that ,  prior to  TSCA, new chemicals were being introduced into corn- 
merce at about the ra te  of 1,000 per year. Ln Fiscal Year 1980 422 applications were subrnit- 
ted to  EPA; as of April 30, 1981, 217 additional applications had been received by EPA. 
Why have several years of effort and several hundreds of millions of 
dollars seemingly produced so little? We suspect that the explanation is 
relatively simple. The problem was never adequately named and analyzed 
so that  sensible implementation strategies were never articulated. 
More important, what is to be done now. For a problem as complex 
as the toxic chemicals problem, there can be no simple answers. 
Nevertheless, t h s  paper aims a t  providing answers of a kind. It does so 
by offering several definitions of the problem and then drawing the impli- 
cations for implementation. The premise of the paper is that  sharp depu- 
tation over simple, idealized, explicit implementation strategies can help 
in the design of the real thing. 
1.3. Overview of the Paper 
Sections 2, 3, and 4 are  the heart of the paper. In each of those sec- 
tions, one perspective on the problem of designing strategies and institu- 
tions for managing toxic chemicals is presented. We have presented 
three different complementary ways of looking a t  the problem because 
we are far--in understanding and perhaps in time--from any simpler view 
of the problem. 
Each of the three perspectives corresponds to a particular view of 
the technical and institutional barriers to effective toxic chemicals 
management. Perspective 1 has been given the name "centralized deci- 
sion." The name assigned to Perspective 2, "decentralized information 
gathering and generation," is essentially self-descriptive. The same might 
be said for what we call Perspective 3, "team-theoretic approaches to 
allocating testing resources to firms." 
Finally, a word on the organization of the paper. Each of sections 2 ,  
3, and 4 is divided into two subsections; in each case, the first is literary 
and the second mildly technical. The nonmathematical reader should be 
able to  get the gist of the paper by reading only the literary sections 
2. PERSPECTIVE 1 : CENTRALIZED INFORMATION GATHERING. GENERA- 
TION, AND DECISION 
2.1. Literary Recapitulation 
We have noted that several very different .kinds of information are  
useful in toxic chemicals hazards management, and that  both possession 
and understanding of much of that  information is "highly decentralized". 
Assembling all that  information in one place with relatively little distor- 
tion and with the contextual information typically essential to  accurate 
interpretation will be extremely costly if not impossible. 
Nevertheless, there are  compelling arguments for attempting and 
paying for. some measure of information centralization.'' To cite one of 
''The informational and incentive issues here are somewhat subtle. A t  one level they can be 
avoided by remembering that a great deal of information about chemicals is already in the 
public domain, so that a government agency hoping t o  use i ts information-generahng 
resources efficiently must face up to  the issue of how to  use that information in allocating its 
resources. Something like the formal development in the text of the paper will be a necep 
sary first step for the agency. 
But the subtler issues are both important and intriguing. A reviewer of this paper 
has noted that both confidentiality and equity have proven troublesome in TSCA implementa- 
tion, and so they have. Let us try to  say why, and think about what can be done. 
Confidentiality i s  an issue because firms understandably want to appropriate the full 
benefits of information they have generated privately. But from a broader social perspec- 
tive, private property in information--"confidentiality"--makes sense only if the geins from 
the induced innovation outweigh the losses from restricting access to  the information. 
Almost all serious students of the innovation process are convinced that reducing 
the ability of firms t o  appropriate the benefits of innovation will reduce innovation. But i t  
does not follow that all information generated by a firm in researching and developing a new 
product should be protected from other claimants. For purposes of argument, suppose that 
two distinct and separable kinds of information are generated. Information I bears on the 
production process and on those characteristics of the new chemical which account for its 
market value. Information bears on the potential health and environmental hazards of 
the  new chemical, and perhaps on the health and environmental hazards posed by related 
chemicals. 
Then it is clear that while there is some justification for protecting confidentiality of 
the most compelling, accurate information developed by one firm can, in 
principle, be shared with other firms at relatively low cost. Thus, if two or 
more enterprises perform the same test or tests on the same chemical, 
resources allocated to duplicative testing are essentially wasted. In part,  
for this reason, efforts to bring data potentially relevant to toxic chemi- 
cals management into once centralized bank are already fairly 
advanced. Suppose, then, that t h s  centralized data base contained all 
the information we ever would be able to use Por designing control and 
regulatory policies for new and existing chemicals. How would we 
proceed? 
Let us develop an answer to t h s  question, an answer that  is specified 
more mathematically in the following subsection. The process rnight 
proceed through several steps or stages. First would come choice of a 
management objective or objectives, then would come characterization of 
the entries in the data base in terms amenable to decision analysis. 
Finally would come an optimization,exercise, leaving us with a designated 
Informtion 1, there is little or not such justificabon for protecting confidentiality of Infor- 
mation 11. In fact the best arrangement would be full protection of Information 1 and fuil 
disclosure of Information 11. (In passing we note that the question of why firms should be 
assigned the role of, or expected to, generate Information 11 has at least two good answers: 
they probably have some comparative advantage in producing Information 11, and the two 
kinds of information are very likely joint products.) Thus the r e d  issue is the extent to  
which Mormation I and hformation 11 really are distinct and separable. I know of no seri- 
ous examination of this question. 
Finally, let us turn to  the problem of equity in allocating the costs of t e s t q  among 
producers of a chemical which, the regulatory agency decides, must be tested. Life is ?ull of 
problems, and this happens to be a particular case of one that is  solved every day elsewhere. 
The provision of every public good inevitably involves a redistributive transfer; the provision 
of information on a particular chemical is  precisely the provision of a public good. I have 
nothng to add here to the literature on sharing the costs of a public good. I do repeat one 
suggestion that has become a commonplace: let firms producing a chemical negotiate among 
themselves the arrangement for sharing the cost of the required testing. 
''several large integrated chemical information systems are in the advanced stages of 
development; like all such systems, they are being built in a modular way, and the least 
developed modules often are those that are most important for our purposes. For an exam- 
ple, in the Chemical Information System the Ames test data base module is still under 
development; this is hardly surprising, since Ames' original paper was published in 1975. 
strategy: a list of instructions, including a testing program and a control 
strategy. In what follows, we mean by a "testing program" something like 
a list of whlch chemicals to test ,  and in whlch order. By a control pro- 
gram we mean a list of whlch chemicals to subject to which regulatory 
restrictions or controls, and in what order. Clearly, running a toxic 
chemicals management program in blind obedience to the optimization 
exercise would probably be disastrous. Equally clearly, exercises of this 
kind are invaluable guides in designing a real program. We proceed to 
justify that claim, and begin by retracing, in more detail, the steps of the 
optimization exercise. 
The first step requires choice of a n  objective or objectives: we sug- 
gest choice of expected net benefits deriving from chemical use as a sen- 
sible initial benefit measure. In the simple, tractable but hghly unrealis- 
tic case in which no two chemicals are substitutable for one another in 
any use, net  benefits from a set  of chemicals are a simple sum of net 
benefits from individual chemicals. Thus, our problem is reduced to iden- 
tification and estimation of the latter. 2 0 
We do that  in two stages. First, we estimate the net  internal 
economic benefits associated with use of the single chemical. Here net 
internal benefit implies deduction of all internal costs, but not the exter- 
nal costs, of the particular single chemical. Those internal costs include 
all costs incurred in generating the information upon whch the ultimate 
expected benefit rides. 
2%s question, and many other similar practical questions, are taken up in work in progress 
at Resources for the Future. 
Next is the really hard step, estimation of the externality costs asso- 
ciated with use of the single chemical. To do no more than touch upon 
the difficulties involved in making that estimate, suppose that for the par- 
ticular chemical in question the only such costs are the health-related 
costs of occupational and general population exposure to that chemical. 
To do the calculation we need three numbers: a shadow price a t  which to 
value health risk.'' an  estimate of the exposure of individuals to the par- 
ticular chemical, and an estimate of the potency of the chemical in pro- 
ducing the particular health effect. By definition, potency is a summary 
measure of the relationshp between dose and response. 
Assume that there is unanimity on the appropriate shadow price of 
health risk. That assumption lets us focus upon the unique difficulties of 
the toxic chemicals case. It is a sad fact of life that the remaining two 
numbers required for estimation of the health cost of the particular sin- 
gle chemical--exposure and potency--are subject to serious uncertainties 
for many chemicals. This is true even for those chemicals which are both 
ubiquitous and suspect carcinogens, mutagens, or teratogens. 
We might proceed by simply making point estimates of both of those 
quantities, but proceeding that  way will foreclose the option of using our 
approach in just those ways that make it potentially valuable. For how- 
ever little we know now about the particular chemical under investigation, 
we may know more in the future--as we subject t h s ,  and closely related 
chemicals, to tests of various kinds. Clearly what is needed is a sys- 
"The "shadow price of health risk" means the monetary value of the resources society is wil- 
ling to forego in order to reduce either some particular, or several, health risks faced by in- 
dividuals a t  the margin. W s  may be equal to indvidual willingness to pay for health risk 
reduction at  the margin, but the two values could differ for many reasons. 
tematic way of integrating new information with exlsting ~nformation on 
the chemical under scrutiny. 
A systematic procedure for tha t  integration is availablezz . To use it. 
we need do only two things. First, our current information on the 
chemical's potency and on the prevailing level of human exposures to 
that  chemical must be expressed probabilistlcally, thereby summarizing 
in thls uniquely convenient form our uncertainties about each of those 
numbers. Second--the next stage of our centralized decision procedure-- 
we need a n  appropriate and consistent characterization of the various 
kinds of information available from chemical testing and from other 
sources, such as exposure measurements 
Suppose we agree to summarize our initial information on our partic- 
ular single chemical by a probability distribution on that chemical's 
potency.23 The standard procedure for revising. or updating. the proba- 
bility distribution in the Light of new information is a procedure called 
Bayes' Rule. To apply that  rule, we need an  expression for the joint pro- 
bability distribution of tha t  potency variable and the random variable we 
ZZ~mvely,  Bayes' theorem tells how, but almost everyone realizes that Bayes' theorem is 
a mechanical procedure whch is far from capturing what goes on in even the everyday in- 
duction in terms of which much workaday science i n s .  TO put the argument in Bayesian 
terms, much of the work is finding the "rlght" likelihood function, and we know of no efficient 
way to routinize that process. 
2 3 ~ e r e  and elsewhere in the 2aper we use the term potency and oogarithmic exposure- 
adjusted) potency interchangeably, and perhaps confusingly. The variabie ki always means 
the latter: the exposure-adjusted logarithmic potency of chemical i. Let us be somewhat 
more fussy and precise, a t  least in t h s .  First, exposure-adjusted means: take the toxioco- 
logical potency and multiply by the number of individuals affected (the population a t  risk 
can be stratified by dose levels). We use the logarithm of t h s  number for two reasons. Be- 
cause of the huge range in potencies and in exposed populations-each ranges over several 
powers of ten--logarithms are more convenient. And by taking the logarithm, we transform a 
variable whch must range over the positive real axis to one that ranges over the whole real 
axis. This is convenient if we want to take a normal distribution to represent the distribubon 
of k i ,  and thus a lognormal distribution to  present the (original, before taking logarithms) 
eqosure-adjusted potency. 
are observing--in whatever kind of testing or informat~on-gathering, we 
undertake. That jolnt distributlon must be grounded in some systematic 
understanding of the relationshp between the logarithmic potency vari- 
able and the random variable being observed. 
Such theories--plausible ones--are hard to come by. Just how hard 
will become clear as soon as we list the various, and diverse, information 
sources from which we can learn more about the  chemical under scru- 
tiny.24 A short list--shortened by simplification and aggregation-must 
include: 
1. searches of the chemical and biological literature; 
2. structure-activity correlation; 
3.  short-term or bacterial testing; and 
4. long-term or animal bioassay testing. 
Now we can be explicit about why we are  still far from the systematic 
understanding we need. Begin with literature searches: i t  seems plausi- 
ble that  toxic chemicals to whch  more people have been exposed have 
been more extensively studied. Forms lor the joint distribution of loga- 
rithmic potency and measures of the amount of attention given a chemi- 
cal by toxicologists and epidemiologists follow from the tentative assurnp- 
tion that more serious problem chemicals have at tracted more and more 
serious a t t e n t i ~ n . ' ~  Random variables characterizing the literature. 
such as the number of articles in a given period, should be correlated 
2 4 ~ e e p  in mind the Limitation of any such formal scheme, and remember the reservations 
expressed in footnote 22. 
25~learly,  h s  is tentative, and could even prove disastrous if taken too seriously: surprises 
do happen, and especially in chemical toxicology. 
with logarithmic potency. This is conjecture. We do not know, because we 
have not yet tried to flnd out, if there are strong relationships between 
variables characterizing searches of the literature and the logarithmic 
potency variable. 
Structure-activity correlation26 (SAC) presents a simpler case. 
because the kind of informatlon generated by structure-activlty correla- 
tion is in exactly the form required for Bayes' Rule revision of probability 
distributions on the logarithmic potency of the particular chemical. 
Because SAC is in its infancy, the joint distributions inferred will typically 
not be very "tight." As SAC evolves, it can be expected to  become a more 
discerning, and for that  reason, more valuable tool. That evolution will be 
reflected in successively "tighter" joint distributions. 
short-term,27 or bacterial, tests  have multiplied in number and 
ingenuity since publication of the initlal test  procedures by Bruce Ames. 
Short-term testing can be brought withn our framework--Bayesian revi- 
sion of probability distributions defined on logarithmic potencies--in 
several seemingly plausible ways; two will highlight the range of choice. 
At one extreme, negative (respectively positive) Ames test  results might 
be interpreted as evidence that the chemical in question is not (respec- 
tively is) carcinogenic. At another extreme, short-term test  results can 
be interpreted as telling us something much more detailed about the car- 
cinogenicity of the particular chemical. 
Z 6 ~ ~ r  a technical survey of the state of the a r t  in structure-activity correlation, see A. 
Stuper, e t  a1 (1979). This is a field in rapid development. The relationship with pattern 
recognition and intelligent data bases, two rapidly developing subfields of artificial intelligen- 
cy, is apparent. Structure-activity correlation has already proven its worth in the  design of 
chemical syntheses; it may evolve into a far more reliable tool in support of toxicology. 
27& . am, see Devoret (1979) and Ames, e t  al. (1975). 
At present, it 1s far from clear which of these views--or whch  inter- 
mediate position--makes sense. Supporting the first view of what can be 
inferred from short-term test  results is the observation that not all 
known human chemical carcinogens test positive in short-term tests. 2 8 
Buttressing the latter view is the empirical observation that the rate of 
growth of' revertent bacteria In short-term tests is strongly correlated 
with the carcinogenic potency, a t  least for chemicals for which measure- 
ments of the lat ter  exist. 2 9 
Under either of these assumptions, a joint probability distribution 
for Bayes' Rule can be written down. But the choice between the two 
assumptions is critical. Because short-term tests are relatively inexpen- 
sive, they are an important potential source of valuable information on 
chemical toxicity--if we believe, and act  as if, the information generated 
by short-term tests is relatively reliable. If ,  for example, we act  as if 
short-term tests  can distinguish only imperfectly between noncarcino- 
gens and carcinogens, those tests  can serve only as a coarse screen. If ,  
on the other hand, we act  as ii revertent bacteria growth rates convey 
valuable information about carcinogenic potency, we may in many cases 
be spared the expense and delay of long-term testing. 
" ~ t  least some of the reasons for this are understood. The Ames test is a test  for chemical 
mutagenicity; that is, for how effective the tested chemical is in forcing revisions in the 
genetic material. Some such revisions are associated with the breakdown in the cell growth 
process called cancer, but there are other ways in which that control system can break 
down. That the cell growth control system is complex, with many levels between the ulti- 
mate "hardware" genetic level and the cellular level is certain. The clearest evidence comes 
from studies of skin cancer. See, for example, John Cairns (1978). 
29The Ames test  uses bacteria lacking in the gene critical to synthesis of an enzyme essen- 
tial to growth. When placed in an environment deficient in that enzyme, only bacteria with 
"revertent" mutation*-mutations whch restore the gene critical to  that synthesis--can 
grow. If a strong carcinogen is placed in the medium, the rate of reversion, and thus the 
growth rate of bacteria, is accelerated. 
For if anything is uncontroversial about long-term testing, it is the 
formidable cost, time, and quality control requirements for such test- 
ing.30 Depenrllng upon the particular test design. adequately controlled 
bioassays with enough tes t  animals to give statistically significant results 
can take from one to three years and cost from several hundred thousand 
to one million dollars. Because those tests are aimed a t  establishing 
causal relationships between exposures (or  doses) and health effects (or  
responses: of various kinds, great  care must be taken to insure that  even 
trace amounts of other potentially carcinogenic contaminants are not 
present,  a requirement whch  imposes additional quality control costs. 
For all these reasons, the checking and validating of bioassay test  results 
by replication doubles or  triples the cost. To date, there has been little 
such replication. 
If proposals to perform long-term tests a re  to be systematically 
evaluated, and if the results of long-term tests are to be used systemati- 
cally, these results must be expressed in a form suitable for revision of 
pre-long-te rm testing probability distributions. Specifically, we must 
know something about the joint probability distribution of "true" carcino- 
genic potencies and of some random variable (or  variables) characteriz- 
ing the results of long-term tests.  Such a joint distribution can be 
developed from our existing stock of long-term testing results, and used 
in the revision step: given a long-term test  on a previously untested 
chemical, it tells us how much to weight that result. 
SO~ecently, much attention in the United States has been focused on the quality control pro- 
cedures underlying the animal testing done in the National Cancer Institute bioassay pro- 
gram and elsewhere. The difficuities in controlling the quality of these procedures is easy to 
understand: trace impurities of any carcinogen not under test can invalidate the rest 
r e d t s .  
Thus far we have suggested only that the results of each of the four 
principal ways of generating informat~on (on logarithmic potencies) can 
be summarized in a particularly convenient way. In that summary form, 
they can be used to systematically and consistently revise our estimates 
of the adjusted (logarithmic) carcinogenic potency of a suspect chemical. 
But we have thus far said notlung about wluch, if any, tests on wluch 
chemicals should be done. We have remarked that exhaustive testing-- 
running all tests on chemicals--is so expensive as to be essentially infeasi- 
ble. Beyond that trivial observation, we have said nothing about how we 
would allocate a given limited testing budget among chemicals and tests. 
That is, after all, the practical question. A more or less ready-made 
approach to this question is available, and is provided by the branch of 
mathematical statistics called statistical decision theory. 
2.2. A Mildly Technical Recapitulation 
Let us see, in very brief outline, how the problem of allocating a lim- 
ited testing budget among both chemicals and possible tests can be cast 
as a fairly standard problem in Bayesian statistical decision theory.31 We 
also want to see "how bad" the large number problem really is: we want 
to know about how rapidly the computational burden of the optimization 
exercise proposed below for sequencing tests grows with problem size. 
"see, for example, Blackwell and Girschck (1954), Ferguson (1967), or de Groot (1970). 
Remember that these are expositions of the theory of Bayesian stati.tistica1 decision theory. 
The computational implementations of that theory in large-number problems raises addi- 
tional, and somewhat novel, problems. 
Sta r t  w ~ t h  our P~rst  task casting the problem as a statistical d e c ~ -  
slon problem. Figure 1 is a n  illustration of the way in w h c h  our  four 
ways of gathering information on a particular chemical might be deployed 
agalnst a single chemical.  Where we have to  resor t  t o  all four 
information-generating opportunities,  we might successively improve our 
est imates  of the (exposure-adjusted logarithmic)32 potency ki of t h a t  ifh 
chemical; the four, presumably successively improved, es t imates  a r e  
k t 1 ) ,  k t2)  , kJ3) , ki(4) in Figure 1, and a r e  obtained a t  costs 
The ki ' s  in  t h a t  diagram a r e  of course heuristic, for we begin with 
imperfect knowledge of ki ,  and  hopefully improve our  es t imate  a s  we 
spend more  on information on  tha t  chemical. But a t  each  s t e p  we have 
only a more o r  less narrow probability distribution defined on  ki. What 
follows below is the  s tandard  Bayesian calculus for sequential revision of 
a n  initial, or  prior probability distribution f o(ki) on  the  (exposure- 
adjusted logarithmic) potency of a single chemical. We write down tha t  
calculus as  if there  were only one chemical t o  be tested and  a s  if the four 
tes ts  were to  be made  in the  sequence indicated o n  Figure 1. We do so 
because half the  a r t  of applied Bayesian analysis lies in  choosing a good 
probabilistic character izat ion of the  kinds of information one has avail- 
able;33 l i terature search  and  biological tes t  results do not naturally come 
in the  form of joint probability distributions, and the  usefulness of such 
information depends crucially upon choice of a n  appropriate form. The 
3 2 ~ e e  note 23 above. 
33~ecall  the difference between mechanical invocation of Bayes' Theorem and real-work in- 
duction; see note 22 above. 

reader 1s warned that ,  Ln the general multic\emlcal sequentlal case, not 
all chem~cals w ~ l l  be subjected to all tests.34 Of course, that  would be 
ruled out in any event slnce the testing budget 1s constrained. But the 
dlstrlbutions below are the essential building blocks of that general 
sequential case, and for that reason we have taken care in defining and 
specify~ng them. 
Introduce notation as follows: 
Prior probability distribution on the 
(exposure-adjusted logarithmic) potency 
k i 
1, (DATALIT[ i]) Joint distribution of DATALIT[i], ki 
f ,(ki I DATALIVT[i] ) Post literature search distribution of ki 
l,(STRUCTURE[i], ki) Joint distribution of STRUCTURE[i], ki 
f z(ki I STRUCTURE[i]) Post structure-activity correlation distri- 
bution of ki 
l,(AMES[i], ki ) Joint distribution of AMES[~], ki 
f 3(ki I AMES[il) Post short-term testing distribution of ki 
~,(BIoASSAY[~], ki) Joint distribution of BIOASSAY[~] and ki 
f s(ki I BIOASSAY[~]) Post-bioassay distribution of ki 
3 4 ~ e r e  we are sloughing over many subtleties and many potential problems. The complexity 
result will depend upon how the problem is cast; there is no best  way. The worst-case results 
typically of complexity theory may not be particularly helpful a s  guides to the  computation 
problem for real data in this area. In any event, t h s  is work in progress and work to  be done. 
The successive distributions f o, f f z ,  f of the variable ki are 
related by the usual Bayes' Rule revision formulas: 
In each successive equation, we have simplified notation by suppressing 
some of the previous stage conditioning values: thus f ,(ki) in the second 
equation stands for l l (k i  I DATALIT[i]), and so on. 
Nothing is easier than writing down formalisms; much more difficult 
is the prior conceptual work guiding the choice of formalization. What, 
then, can we say about the appropriate forms of the functions 
f ,. f 2, f 3, 11, 12, l3 which we have so blithely written down above? Else- 
where we have written on t h s  question; here we content ourselves with a 
few words on the logic of those recommended initial ch.oices, since the 
real work of implementation will require substantial refinement of those 
initial choices. 
Each such choice reflects a commitment to a theory of, or a t  least a 
view of, the process by wh c h  the information to be exploited came into 
existence. It may be plausible to suppose that  chemicals to which more 
individuals are exposed and which are more toxic have drawn more atten- 
tion from toxicologists and epidemiologists:35 that supposition guides 
one form of the joint distribution ll. It may be plausible to suppose that 
structure-activity correlation provides good relative, but poor absolute, 
information on the ki variables. Again, that supposition leads immedi- 
ately to a particular function form for the joint distribution 12. Similarly, 
for short-term or bacterial testing, the relevant supposition is that such 
tests discriminate powerfully between noncarcinogens and carcinogens, 
but only poorly between carcinogens differing, even by a few orders of 
magnitude, in carcinogenic potency. For long-term or bacterial tests,  the 
relevant supposition is that such tests give good information on Ic , ,  if at  
relatively h g h  cost. These latter two suppositions, like the first two, lead 
naturally to formalizations of the corresponding joint distributions, here 
lg and lq. 
Now let us remember that  our real problem involves a decision about 
which tests we will apply to which chemicals and in which order. Because 
of the "large numbers problem", thls is naturally posed as a sequential 
decision problem, but only can be practical if the computational burdens 
imposed by the large numbers problem are not overwhelming.36 So let 
us pose, more or less rigorously, the sequential decision problem we face, 
and then let us see how rapidly the computational burden grows with the 
"problem size." The obvious measure of problem size here is, of course, 
the number of chemicals N c .  
35~gain, we take note of the importance of surprises in toxicology; see note 25. The real 
question remains: how to characterize the existing literature 8s an information resources, 
and how to  use i t  efficiently. 
'%ee for example, Aho, et al. (1974) or Garey and Johnson (1979). 
Thls decislon problem, like any other, must be driven by an objective 
function describing just what we are trying to accomplish with a toxic 
chemicals testing program. Here is one such objective function; others 
are possible and may even be better, but one will do for illustrative pur- 
poses.37 The testing program optimization problem is taken as 
Here we have drawn on our assumption that the benefits associated with 
individual chemicals are independent and additive; b is the benefit per 
chemical, net of (internal) production costs, but gross of possible exter- 
nality costs arislng from introduction of that chemical into commerce. 
The subscript n( i )  is an ordered subset of the integers, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 
indicates those tests whch  have been run, and the order of whch they 
were run, in the optimum program, on chemical i. If none have been run, 
it consists of the single value 0. The probability distribution fn(i)(ki) is 
the result of Bayesian revision in the order in which tests are performed. 
The multiplicative coefficient g ( i )  is 0 or 1, as the chemical is banned 
from or allowed into commerce. Thus, t h s  objective is nothing but the 
expected net benefits of chemicals remaining in commerce. 
Given this (or any other plausible) objective function, we can turn to 
the problem of constructing the implied optimum program. The theoreti- 
cal problem was settled long ago by the work of Wald, Blackwell and Gir- 
s c h i ~ k , ~ ~  and others. 
37~gain, this is work in progress on TSCA implementation a t  Resources for the Future. 
"see Wald (1847) and Blackwell and Girschick (1954). 
Here is a very brief summary of what that  line of work tells us. Sup- 
pose we are given a loss function for a decision problem. That loss is 
defined on A x S ,  with A the space of actions and S the set of states of 
nature. We do not know whch  state of nature prevails, but we can, at  cost 
c j ,  make an observation on a random variable rj  for whch  the joint distri- 
bution ( r j , s )  is known. Then Wald and Blackwell and Girschck tell us 
how to choose a sequence of observations, how to decide when to stop, 
and which action Prom A to  take when we do stop. 
Our practical problem is easily seen to be similar: the states of 
nature are the [k,IicNc, our actions are  [ g  ( z ) ] ~ , ~ ~ ,  and our four kinds of 
tests allow us observation--at some cost--on variables whose joint distribu- 
tions with the ki 's we think we know something. The novel feature of our 
problem is the large numbers problem: how reasonable are  the Wald- 
Blackwell-Girschlck rules when the  number of chemicals NC becomes 
large, say 1,000 or even 10,000? If the time t o  compute a good testing 
program is bounded by some fairly low-order polynomial in NC , say I I 
 IN^^^, t h ~n g s  may be tolerable. If the dependence is exponential, say exp 
 IN^ I ] ,  the scheme described above is obviously of no practical impor- 
tance. It is easy to show that the bound is polynomial; for the two-test 
case, it is exactly N C  l 3  39 We mention here that  the application to the 1 i .  
chemicals case of the Wald-Blackwell-Girschick apparatus is not exactly 
straightforward, in part  because the tests  we have described give infor- 
mation on many of the ki's simultaneously. 
3 9 ~ e e  note 36. 
3. PERSPECTIVE 2: DECENTRALIZED INFORMATION-GATHERING AND 
GENERATI ON : LIABILlTY-BASED INCENTIVE SCHEMES 
3.1. Literary Recapitulation 
We have suggested that information relevant to toxic chemicals 
management problems is widely held and both expensive and bothersome 
to transfer without distortion. A similar remark applies to candidate 
strategies for generating additional information. A little reflection on the 
degree of informational centralization implied by the "centralized deci- 
sion" model highlights the need for much chemical testing and explora- 
tion of alternative control policies to be performed in a decentralized 
fashton--by individual firms, and even in individual plants. 
That much is easy to say. It is harder to insure that an appropriate 
amount of (decentralized) effort is being expended, and that relevant and 
reasonably accurate summaries of that  information are being transmit- 
ted to some "center" for use in those decisions which cannot, or should 
not, be decentralized. Looked a t  this way, the problem becomes one of 
incentive sys tern design: what incentive system accomplishes those 
ends? 
Here we identify, in an  informal way, the principal issues of the 
incentive design problem40 An idealized version of one such incentive 
system would require that firms generate or assemble and then transfer 
40There are other places where such problems arise, though they are inevitably somewhat 
different in character. One example is the insurance industry: information about individual 
subscribers is valuable to individual f i r m ,  and is t o  some extent transferred among and 
shared by firms. Neglect of these arrangements may have led some theorists t o  conclusions 
about the stability and efficiency of the insurance industry that are, to say the least, counter 
factual; see Rothschdd and Stlglitz (1976). But they are hardly to be blamed. Work on the 
question of the value of alternative information gathering and sharing schemes is both diffi- 
cult and in its infancy. 
to the designated regulatory agency or governmental body, specifled 
inrormatlon on suspect existing, or new, chemicals intended for ~ntroduc-  
tion into commerce. The designated information might include estimates 
of occupational exposure, environmental releases a t  several hypothetical 
production levels, the associated general population exposures, and car- 
cinogenic potency. Those are simple summary measures of the kinds of 
information typically required for hazard assessment--or assembled in 
testing. They may or may not be the best summary measures; the neces- 
sity of choosing a few such summary measures for transfer is clear. 
Equally apparent are the incentives that firms and individuals may 
have to either engage in too little testing, or to transmit strategically dis- 
torted summary measures.41 Those incentives are  particularly strong 
for chemicals whch may affect large populations a t  low levels of expo- 
sure, and for those chemicals which may be implicated in health effects 
which cannot be unambiguously traced to any single chemical. Submis- 
sion by firms of "strategically" low estimates of the carcinogenic potency 
of a proposed new chemical, for example, can be expected to push a 
government decision on that  new chemical toward the outcome favored 
by the firm. 
Against those incentives to insufficient testing and strategic 
misrepresentation, at  least two contrivances can be deployed. Scientific 
norms requiring the submission of sincere, or honest, estimates exist and 
411mplying that someone, or some institution may be tempted to  "lie"--the euphemism is 
strategic misrepresentation-- raises hackles. No such implication is intended here. We sug- 
gest only that additional incentive to  tell t i e  truth can in Dr. Johnson's phrase, "concentrate 
the mind." On quite another issue, some insist that existing ez post liability schemes can do 
the job. For a characteristically brilliant and rather devastating attack on this position, see 
Judge David Bazelon (1980). 
matter ,  but may alone be inadequate. Those norms can be reinforced by 
a system of complementary economic incentives explicitly penalizing 
~nsincere,  or strategic, transmission of information on an existing or new 
chemical.42 Properly designed. those incentive schemes should both 
prompt the right amount of testing by firms and insure the transmission 
of sincere information by firms to the government since such liability- 
based incentive schemes may, and should, be a part of many national tox- 
ics programs, the design problem is a practical and timely one. A formal 
attack on part of that problem is presented below in the next subsection. 
Here we content ourselves with an informal description of those results. 
The purpose of a liability scheme is to encourage individual decision- 
making units--typically firms--to act,  in generating, using and transmit- 
ting information on toxic chemicals, in the broader social interest 
represented by the government agency responsible for toxic chemicals 
management. Firms and government agencies typically will have conflict- 
ing objectives; liability-based incentive schemes aim a t  reconciliation. 
First let us focus on part  of the design problem. Assume that  firms 
know the truth about their prospective chemicals, but that they transmit 
"strategic," as opposed to sincere, hazard assessments: that is, they 
transmit hazard assessments contrived to induce the government to  act  
as the firm wants i t  to  act .  In particular, the firms may have both its own 
42There are obvious resonances with several strands of the  existing literature, and even with 
some of the venerable Literature of probability theory. For the older literature, see de 
Finetti's (1972) well-known scheme for forcing a risk-neutral individual to reveal h s  subjec- 
tive probabil~ties. The exercise presented here extends this approach t o  the case of a 
principal-agent problem where neither pincipal nor agent are risk-neutral, and where their 
risk preferences may differ. for an early statement of the principal-agent problem, see Ross 
(1974). For a survey of resuits in the closely related area of incentive-compatibility, see 
Green and Laffont (1 079). 
best (or "sincere") estlmate of the likelihood that  the chemical will later 
be proved carcinogenic, but may transmit to the government "strategic" 
estimates of those probabilities which dlffer f rom the sincere, or "best," 
estimate. 
Two sources of the  temptation to report "insincere" estimates may 
be particularly important. First, even if the  chemical in question is in 
fact carcinogenic, detection and correct attribution of the effect may be 
impossible over the latency period of the chemical.43 Even a t  post- 
exposure times greater  than the latency period, detection and attribution 
may be nearly impossible because of the difficulty of reconstructing indi- 
vidual exposure histories. Second, if health effects are produced syner- 
gistically, the situation becomes even more problematic. Identification of 
a single agent as  causally responsible may be logically impossible: in this 
case health effects are  the joint products of exposures to individual 
chemicals and responsibility for those effects cannot be unambiguously 
allocated to individual chemicals. 44 
Taken together, these technical and physiological facts strongly sug- 
gest that  the firm's strategic estimates of hazard probabilities will be sig- 
nificantly smaller than sincere estimates. The incentive design problem 
can now be spelled out: the government should set  its liability schedule 
to compensate for the firm's temptation to submit strategic estimates of 
4 3 ~ u c h  of the evidence bearing on the chronic--as opposed to the acute--health effects of 
environmental pollution has come from aggregate environmental epidemiology. For a 
methodological critique of this, both of work and for quantitative estimates of the residual 
uncertainties in our estimates of health impacts, see the author's forthcoming monograph. 
44The problem referred to is  related to the problem referred to, in the economics literature, 
a s  the  joint-cost allocation problem; here the joint product is an undesirable environmental 
contaminant produced synergistically by two effluents. "In principle" if only the synergistic 
product is hazardous, only one firm should be "discouraged" by the liability scheme from 
polluting. 
hazard probabilities. Roughly speaking, the condition determining the 
best liability rule is: the firm's strategic hazard probability estimates, 
when calculated in Pull knowledge of the liability or indemnity conditions 
imposed by the government, should coincide with the "best," or "sincere" 
probability estimates it would transmit to the government in the absence 
of any temptation to strategic misrepresentation. 
Some technical difficulties arise in implementing t h s  condition. 
Nevertheless it should be apparent even prior to detailed formulation and 
calculation that the implied liability or indemnity provisions fcr 
misrepresentation are quite large. An example may help: say the stra- 
tegic hazard assessment is a factor of 10 smaller than the sincere esti- 
mate of carcinogenic potency. Then the imposed penalty for 
misrepresentation might have to be as large as 10 times the expected 
loss to redress the balance. If, for example, $1,000,000 in losses result 
from a single chemical, the corresponding liability for misrepresentation 
might have to be as h g h  as 110,000,000. 
Before continuing, we remind the reader that we have treated only 
part of the incentive design problem, and in doing so have deliberately 
set aside the design requirement that the incentive scheme prompt the 
right amount of information generation by firms. 45 
*%e separated the two requirements by assuming that firms know the truth about their 
chemicals. Of course, they typically do not. Examination of the case in which they do not 
ieads to  some techniczlly difficuit and intrigumg problems in economc theory: here we can 
do no more than provide a clean statement of those problems, which is often half the battle. 
First suppose that the incentive scheme has successfully transferred t o  the firm the 
government's attitude towards risk, summarized by the utility function U .  Suppose further 
that the firm can generate information only by repetition of one kind of tes , ach repetition 
costing e dollars. U the  firm begins with a prior probabihty distribution tbY(s), then suc- 
lead t o  successive Bayesian revisions of the probability distribution which we 
The government's purposes will have been served if the firm tests n * times, 
where n * solves the maximization problem 
n max E [u(c(s)-ne)] 
3.2. A Mildly Technical Recapitulation 
Usually when we t h n k  of incentive and liability arrangements for 
toxic chemicals, we have in mind the liability firms should bear for dam- 
ages their products may inflict on individuals. If those liability schemes 
are well designed, they provide incentives to firms to avoid inflicting such 
damages. But here we have somethng very different in mind: incentive 
schemes aimed a t  insuring the accuracy and veracity of information on 
new chemicals submitted by firms to the government regulatory 
agency46. For new chemicals. such information is necessarily an impor- 
tant  basis for government decision making. Willfully transmitted misin- 
formation can seriously distort that  decision process. How can liability 
for such misinformation save us from that  fate? 
Here is a very simple setup for the design of a liability scheme. 
Introduce the following notations: 
u~ Government (or social) utility 
u~ Firm (or private) utility 
b Social benefits of single chemical use 
S Set of s tates of nature; s E S 
The expectation is computed with respect to the distribution tp)z, 
A s  stated this problem is already respectably complex: it is a nonlinear integer prw 
grarnrning problem. But now remember that,  superimposed upon t h s  problem, we have the 
principal agent problem: in general the firm utility function UF and the government utility 
function U G  differ, and the incentive scheme must force the results they give to coincide. 
We have a novel combination of two staples of the economics of uncertainty: the principal- 
$gent problem and the search problem. 
Again, for the relevant strands L? the economics literature, see note 42. 
D Detectlon/nondetect~on states; d = 1 (detection), d = 0 
(nondetection) 
C ( S )  Social cost of single chemical use 
h (s)c  ( s )  Civil liability schedule 
h (s , d )  Firm's perceived civil liability schedule 
~ ( s  True distribution 
m ~ ( s  Firm's optimal revealed distribution (or message) to 
government 
~ F ( S  Firm's best-estimate distribution 
Y b Profit accruing to firm 
P r ( d )  Firm's detection/attribution estimate 
S z D  Set of slates of nature 
In this setup we have introduced two utility functions uc and u ~ ,  
representing the risk attitudes of the government and the firm. What u~ 
should be is a matter  of public policy; presumably only empirical work 
can tell us what uF is.47 Both firm and government agree that net bene- 
fits associated with introduction of the new chemical into commerce are  
equal to b ,  and the firm knows that  a fraction y of those benefits will 
accrue to it as profit, for a total profit of yb 
But what is uncertain are the social costs imposed by the chemical, 
and the government's prospects for correctly identifying the chemical as 
an offender in the event that it does prove troublesome. The former class 
F 7 ~ n d e r  the extreme assumptions of the Arrow-Debreu (1050) model, firms are risk-neutral 
and maximize, expected profits; when complete futures markets exist, all risk is borne by 
"consumers" or by the "government". But, jecause complete futures markets do not exist 
and for other reasons, real-world firms are not risk averse. Just what the relevant function 
UF is must therefore be  established empirically. Similarly, choosing uc is a question of 
public policy. The issue is how risk-averse do we want to  be about toxic chemicals-related 
risks? 
of uncertalntles is captured by the set S of possible toxicity/exposure 
states s ;  the latter class is captured by D ,  the set of possible 
detection/attribution states. Taken together, the set S z D is the set of 
states of nature, and element of that set ( s , d )  identifies a particular toxi- 
city and detection state. 
In the toxicity states s ,  the chemical in question imposes social costs 
c ( s ) .  Neither firm nor government, of course, know whch s is the true 
state; the whole point of the communication process about to be 
described is to encourage the firm to submit the appropriate information. 
The information actually submitted to the government by the firm 
we write as m F ( s ) ,  with m for "message:" that information is in the form 
of a probability distribution on the combined toxicity/exposure states of 
the chemical. This may or may not be identical with the firm's "best," or 
sincere, estimate of the chemical's hazards. The latter we write as 
t F ( s  , d ) ,  indicating that the firm has a joint distribution on the states of 
nature S z D .  In some cases that joint distribution may factorize con- 
veniently. Below, for purposes of exposition, we will assume such factori- 
zation, so that: 
t F ( s 8 d )  = ~ F ( s )  p ~ ( d )  1 
with p F ( d )  the firm's marginal distribution on D .  
We are aiming toward formalization of t h s  situation: the firm 
transmits its message m F ( s )  to the government, and the government 
decides, on the basis of that message, to either bar introduction of the 
chemical into commerce, or to allow such introduction. Suppose the firm 
knows the government's decision rule; that is, the firm knows how the 
government maps the received message into a decision. Then it is 
apparent that the temptation to misrepresentation exists In principle, 
the firm can decide what it wants the government to do about the chemi- 
cal in question--presumably allow introduction, since otherwise no appli- 
cation for such introduction will be made to the government--and then 
send a message whch will lead the government, "by the nose," to that 
conclusion. 
Against that temptation, the government can array only a liability 
schedule h ( s ) ,  a fee to be assessed by the government, against the firm, 
in the event that subsequent events suggest that the orlginal message was 
in fact a m i ~ r e ~ r e s e n t a t i o n . ~ ~  The principle upon whch the liability 
schedule h ( s )  should be designed seems clear enough: it should guide 
the firm to reporting of its best-estimate probabilities. Message m F ( s )  
and sincere belief nF(s )  should coincide, or at  least be close enough so 
that the government agency is not led to the wrong decision. 
Let us see if this can be arranged "in generalu--that is, without 
imposing special assumptions on the state spaces and functions. Ths can 
be done by examining a particularly simple case which nonetheless cap- 
tures most of the difficulties of the general case. In that simple case, the 
space of states of nature S  z D is as simple as can be: ~ = [ 0 , 1 ] ,  with 0  for 
nontoxicity and 1  for toxicity, and ~ = [ 0 , 1 ] ,  with 0  for nondetection and 1  
for detection. 
Figure 2 illustrates the expected utility maximization calculations 
which firm and government must perform in t h s  particular case. The 
48~gain, see Judge David Bazelon's address, cited in note 41. 
F i g u r e  2a.  D e c i s i o n  P rob lem o f  the Fi rm 
F i g u r e  2b. D e c i s i o n  P rob lem o f  t h e  Government 
firm (Figure 2a) chooses a message mF(0), mF( l ) ;  the government (Fig- 
ure 2b) takes that message as given and then computes expected social 
utility from the two alternatives "bar from entrance into commerce" and 
"allow into commerce." If the chemical is barred, social utility is uG(0) ,  
since no benefits or losses accrue; 0 does reflect the opportunity costs of 
benefits b foregone by restriction. If the chemical is not barred, the 
government proceeds to calculate expected social utility with the firm's 
message probabilities taken a t  face value. For example, if the chemical 
proves toxic, social utility is u G ( b  -c( l ) ) .  Thus, we can write the 
government's decision rule gG[m] as a functional on the firm's message 
m .  First compute 
and then decide according to: if gG[m] is positive, allow into commerce; 
otherwise do not allow into commerce. 
We return now to the firm's problem. The firm is armed with sincere 
estimates tF(s)  ( 1  for "truth") of the probabilities that the chemical is 
toxic, and with an estimate pF(d)  of the probability of 
detection/attributlon in the event that  the  chemical does prove toxic. Its 
decision rule is therefore based upon a computation of the functional 
f F [ t  , p  , h ]  of those probability distributions and of the civil liability 
schedule h ( s ) .  That functional is given by: 
The issue of liability schedule design can now be posed in a more or 
less precise way. Can the government choose h ( s ) ,  the civll liability 
schedule, so that the firm is led to submit a message mF(s)  to the 
government whch  never, or hardly ever, leads to conflict between govern- 
ment and firm decisions? In other words, can h ( s )  be devised so that  the 
firm never has an  incentive to submit information to the government 
which will lead the government to decide in the firm's interest,  rather 
than in the more general social interests? If so, we say tha t  h ( s )  sup- 
ports consistent decisions. But consistency alone is not enough--there is 
no particular virtue in consistent, but wrong decisions. We want some- 
thing more; we want those consistent decisions to  be accurate, in the 
sense that the firm's strategic message r n ~  is identical with its sincere 
message tF. T h s  can, under some additional assumptions, be accom- 
plished by adjusting the dependence of the liability schedule h ( s )  on the 
firm's message; for example, the liability payment h(1)  can be taken to 
be proportional to (l-m, (1)). The constant of proportionality is chosen 
to guarantee, again under additional assumptions (including the assurnp- 
tion that the firm chooses an  mF(l)  maximizing the expected utility of 
profit), both consistency and accuracy. 
4. PERSPECTIVE 3: CENTRALIZED ALLOCATlON OF TESTING RESOURCES 
TO FIRMS: TEAM-THEORETIC MODEIS 
4.1. Literary Recapitulation 
In discussing the design of a liability schedule for misrepresentation 
of the hazards posed by a new chemical, we have assumed that  firm and 
government objectives are divergent. Firms maximize the expected 
utility of profits; the government imposes upon firms an incentive scheme 
guiding those firms toward socially desirable action--the transmission of 
sincere chemical hazard assessments. 
Ths  section builds upon a radically different set  of assumptions 
about the incentives of firms and the government. Here we suppose that  
there is no divergence between what firms and the government want with 
respect to toxic chemicals management policy: both are intent upon 
arriving a t  toxic chemicals management decisions consistent with social 
objectives. But here we depart from the informational assumptions 
underlying Perspective 1. In Perspective 1, all information was assumed 
costlessly accessible to the government agency charged with toxic chemi- 
cals management; in this section we make the (somewhat more realistic) 
assumption that such information is widely dispersed, and that  full infor- 
mational centralization is impossible, for reasons that are  technical, 
economic, or  both. 
Under these new assumptions, there may still remain a critical role 
for the government agency: that role is essentially one of coordination. 
Coordination can insure that decentralized decisions to generate informa- 
tion on potentially hazardous chemicals are not wastefully duplicative, 
and that  resources expended in generating additional information are  
allocated efficiently. In t h s  context, efficiency means that more atten- 
tion is paid to the more serious potential hazards. We want to  derive 
some rules of thumb for the government to use in allocating total chemi- 
cal testing resources among firms, and in choosing along "communication 
systems" between firms and the government. Use of the phrase "allocat- 
ing final testing resources and effort among firms" should not be taken to 
imply that all such resources and effort are under the control of the 
government or "center". Everything that follows 1s entirely consistent 
with a situation in which all chemical testing and evaluation funds are 
internally generated by flrms. In both cases, the real issue 1s the best 
allocation of total testing resources and effort. 
The issues raised by the need to choose among communication sys- 
tems are somewhat subtle. By "communication system," we mean no 
more than the kinds of information transferred among firms, and 
between firms and the government. Some such system will necessarily be 
chosen, or will evolve, for even though decisions on particular chemicals 
will inevitably require particular kinds of communication and attention, 
an enormous number of chemicals will, over the coming decades, be pro- 
cessed by government agencies charged with toxic chemicals manage- 
ment. Some standardization and routinization of information transfer 
and decision procedures in inevitable. 
Clearly, requiring that all information generated be transferred to all 
parties is out of the question: all parties would then drown in informa- 
tion. The hard-copy documents generated during the course of a single 
bioassay on a particular chemical, for example, will typically fill a small 
truck. The practical issue in communlcations-system design is thus what 
kinds of information transfer should be required, both among firms and 
between firms and the government?49 We proceed here by examining a 
particular problem, one whlch suggests that a natural framework for 
thinking about these questions must combine team-theoretic notions with 
l g ~ o r  the existing system, and some discussion of its evolution, see the author's forthcoming 
monograph on TSCA implementation. 
more recent results in the area of computational complexity. Below, in 
the next subsection, the whole exercise is repeated somewhat more tor- 
mally . 
Figure 3 is schematic of the particular problem of interest. A 
"center"--the agency regulating toxic chemicals communicates with 
firms, makes observations on the external environment (does experi- 
ments).  Firms--too do experiments, and in general communicate among 
themselves and with the center. (For simplicity two firms have been 
drawn in Figure 3, but any number might have been drawn.) In general, 
both the center and individual firms can take actions. 
Figure 3 is so general as to be vacuous; it can be made more specific 
in a great number of ways. In fact, there will be one well-specified version 
of Figure 3 corresponding to  each way of assigning observation, communi- 
cation and decision responsibilities to firms and to the center. Because 
the number of possible well-specified versions of Figure 3 is so large, in 
practice we can do little more than write down, and compare, a few such 
well-specified versions. And to  have a sensible standard for comparison 
we must have an objective function for the center. 
Here, in words, is the promised well-specified example (formal treat-  
ment is postponed to the next subsection). There are n firms, each of 
which produces some amount of the same numeraire consumption good 
with chemical production-process inputs. Each firm production imposes 
both occupational and general population exposures to its chemical 
inputs, and each firm is characterized by a production/transformation 
frontier linking chemical inputs and numeraire good output. Each firm 
moreover has developed a subjective joint probability distribution 

function defined on chemical potencies, and on occupational and general 
population exposures. That distribution has been built up from experi- 
ence and previous experimentation. Additional information is available to 
the  firm on that distribution, but a t  a price: after the fashion of statisti- 
cal decision theory we assume that the firm can learn more by drawing 
upon another joint distribution of potency and exposure variables. 
The center is endowed with a testing budget (expressed in terms of 
the numeraire good) and is directed to act in accordance with specified 
shadow prices for the health risks of occupational and general population 
exposures. The center  can learn more about particular chemicals by 
drawing on its own joint distribution of potency and exposure, incurring 
some unit cost with each draw: neither that  unit cost, nor that distribu- 
tion need be identical with those describing the firms. Finally, there are 
explicit costs attached to communication between firms and the center, 
and to communication among firms. 
Now consider two proposed alternative assignments of observation, 
communication and decision responsibilities. In the first, all testing is 
done by firms, and the testing budget is allocated by the center  based 
upon received summary measures of firms' joint distributions. In the 
second, all testing is done by the center, again based upon received surn- 
mary measures of the firms' joint distributions. In both cases, final 
abatement decisions--decisions to trade off numeraire-good output 
against occupational and general population exposures--are taken by 
firms subject to the mandated social shadow price of health risk. 
Which alternative is superior? The novel feature of the framework we 
have introduced is the possibility of answering this question. In princ~ple, 
the answer is simple: the alternative offering the hlgher expected net 
benefit. The relevant benefit is numeraire good output net of health risk 
and testing costs. The latter are calculated a t  the relevant social shadow 
prices. 
4.2. A Mildly Technical Recapitulation 
Now let us repeat the example of the previous subsection somewhat 
more formally, and then tie that more formal version to the extensions of 
team theory that  we believe are demanded by the issues a t  hand. Let us 
be brave, and introduce the following notation and variables: 
Set  of firms; ~ E I  
Potency of ith chemical 
Numeraire-good output of ith firm 
Zi Occupational exposures to ith chemical 
Random variable for experiments on ith chemical 
Number of tests on ith chemical by ith firm 
Number of tests on ith chemical by the govern- 
ment 
Unit cost of testlng 
Total testing budget constraint 
Firm i prior (joint) distribution 
Firm i posterior (joint) distribution 
Joint distribution describing experiments avail- 
able to firm i 
t  [:)'I (kz qi  , zi )  Government prio,. (joint) distribution on chemical 
i varla'ules 
e(i'g)(ki. qi, zi , ui )  Joint distribution describing experiments (on 
chemical i )  available to the government 
- 
t[:] (kin qi .  zi) Summary measure of firm i posterior joint distri- 
bution 
qjg) (ki , qi , zi )  Government posterior (joint) distribution on 
chemical i variables 
P Consumption-goods shadow price of health risk 
The setup we are  after should describe the following situation. Each 
distinct firm uses one chemical to produce some quantity of the  
numeraire good qi,  and in so doing also produces occupation exposures 
zi to that  chemical. Because the firm's knowledge of the technological 
relationshp between output and occupational exposure is imperfect, the  
firm's initial knowledge of that  relationship is described by a joint proba- 
bility distribution t [ j ]  Because the firm is uncertain about the 
chemical's potency Xi, that  variable also occurs as an argument of t[,']. 
even though sensible experiments to improve information about the value 
of that  variable will be very different from those that will improve infor- 
mation about the other arguments of t[:] 
Now the firm can obtain better inf'ormation on the relationshp 
between the variables ki ,  qi, x i ,  but only a t  a price: by paying the unit 
cost of testing c the firm can make an observation on the random vari- 
able ui, which is tied to the  variables of interest by the distribution 
e(i)(ki,  pi, zi. ui) .  That latter distribution is known to the firm, and is a 
standard way of describing experimental possibilities. If the firm does 
buy information by testing chemical i ,  we assume that the purchased 
~nformation is used to revise the firm's prior dlstributlon t [:I. We assume 
that  the revision method 1s Baye's Rule, and the resulting (posterior) dis- 
tribution is labeled t [ v .  
The information available to the firm is embodied in t f i j ,  and if the 
information is very detailed that  distribution may be thought of as 
parametric, but with many parameters. In general, transmission of more 
detailed information can be more costly, so that  only some summary 
measures of any given distribution will be transmitted to  the government. 
We use t ( ~ y )  to denote the summary measures of the distribution actually 
transmitted to the government. In principle any number of such sum- 
mary measures, from zero to a full se t  of summary measures completely 
specifying the distribution, can be communicated. Any particular realiza- 
tion of Figure 3 will, of course, require a commitment to  one such set, and 
that  set  will then describe the messages sent by firms to the government. 
Now let us turn to the  government. The government has resources 
CT to be committed to testing, and will allocate those resources based 
upon its own information and the information obtained from individual 
firms. In particular, the government has prior distribution 
t[tjg) (k i ,  q i ,  q) on the ith chemical variables, and has in its possession 
joint distributions e(i lg)(ki ,  q i ,  zi, ui) describing its opportunities for 
learning more about each of these chemicals. It has been instructed to 
use a (social) numeraire-good shadow price of health risk p in making its 
decisions. The government has also been saddled with the unenviable 
responsibility of organizing the framework in whlch testing and regulation 
will proceed: that  entails, a t  the very least, deciding who should do what 
t e s t~ng ,  deciding how the results should be communicated among firms 
and the government, and choosing decision rules for chemicals. 
Remember that it is specific realizations of the general scheme of 
Figure 3 that  we wish to rank, and that ,  in order to do that ranking, we 
need an objective function. Here is one such particular realization, and 
one such function. In the realization, both firms and the government do 
testing, in accordance with a centrally-calculated testing program 
( n ( , ) ,  n ( g l i ) ) :  by definition that program dictates the intensity of testing 
of each chemical by government and firms. Subsequent to execution of 
the mandated tests by firms, firms communicate to  the government sum- 
mary measures of their posterior distribution: that  is, it is the t ~ j ' )  tha t  
are transmitted to the government. Given this information, and given the  
results of the government testing program, the government revises its 
own prior distributions t [ t ) g )  arriving a t  the posterior distributions 
t f i 7 . g ) .  The testing program is designed by computing: 
subject to 
and with the expectation calculated with respect to the distribution tcj ' ) .  
That distribution recognizes all possible outcomes of experiments 
described by the distributions e ( i )  and e ( i s g ) .  Final calculation of produc- 
tion levels is done only in the light of the  particular results obtained by 
firms and by the government in their testing programs. Call those latter 
distributions t ( ? Y m g )  (k,, pi .  2,): then output variables qi are assigned by 
solving 
( ~ i ) i c ~  
The maximization is unconstrained. 
That completes our description of one realization of the  schematic of 
Figure 3. The reader can easily see that many others are  feasible, and 
may even be superior according to the (first) objective function. An 
example: the center might communicate only the shadow price p to indi- 
vidual firms, asking them to estimate the social optimal number of tests 
for their own chemical. Those estimates, returned to the center, can be 
compared with the testing budget constraint: if, taken together, they 
exceed the constraint, an  iterative process can be used to  ration testing 
resources 
Many other particular realizations can be described, and may be of 
interest.  But that 1s work to be done: our purpose here is simply to sug- 
gest that a combination of team-theoretic and statistical-decision 
theoretic notions can sustain some rigorous work on the institutional 
design problem, and may even enrich team theory in a way that  only 
practical applications can. 
To persuade the reader that  such enrichment is a possibility, let us 
indicate the formal relationshp between team theory5' (as formulated 
by Roy Radner) and the kinds of specific institutional design problems 
described above. The reader with no interest in the relationship to 
Radner's work can, and perhaps should, skip the following pages. 
5 0 ~ e e  Marschak and Radner (1972), Radner (1972), and Groves and Radner (1972). 
Radner's description of a teamh1 is sufficiently abstract that it can 
be summarized with a few pages of notation and several definitions. 
Finally, we need the following spaces and functions characterizing infor- 
mation access and task assignment in a team: 
N ~ j t o  1 All agents ("team members") and nature (0) 
T;o .i] Observation set of  EN; toi(s)rT[o.i]: tOi(s) = [ ~ ~ ~ ( s ) .  eOi(s)] 
signal and noise 
T [ i , j  ] Message space (communication set), i to ji, i ,  j EN 
T[i 1 Internal output message set of iEN; 
~ [ i ]  = n ~ [ i , j ]  
j & N  
j # i  
R b ]  Internal input message set of  EN; 
~ [ i ]  = n T [ i , j ]  
j & N  
j # i  
~ ( i )  Task function of i & N ;  T ( z ) : R [ ~ ]  -r T[i]  
N Network, or formal organization; see below: 
Figure 4 may help the reader to organize these notions in his or her 
mind; essentially what we have is a designated set of agents capable of 
communicating with one another and with the external environment. 
Among the latter form of communication, we include any activity bringing 
information within the organizational boundary: literature searches, 
''see Marschak and Radner (1972). 

discussions with other firms, and laboratory experiments all count here 
Two alternative summary characterizations of teams can be based 
upon the above concepts; they will differ in their usefulness in guiding 
empirical investigation. Marschak and Radner ( i 972), in their seminal 
book, introduce two such characterizations. 
A team in payoff-function form (PFF) is characterized by: 
T = ( S, M ,  A ;  WG, CI 
Remember that  the gross payoff and net payoff mappings are  real-valued 
maps: 
The related expected-value mappings are  defined in the obvious way: 
A team in network computation form (NCF) is characterized by: 
The PFF and NCF characterizations of a team differ as follows. In 
PFF, the team message sets and team action sets  are assumed known; 
that  is, all observation, communication, and decision assignments for all 
team members are  assumed known. The information cost function CI is 
likewise assumed known. In NCF, the team message set  M and action set  
A are constructed by the explicit assignment of decision and communica- 
tion responsibilities to  team members. Similarly, the information cost 
function CI is built up from explicit assumptions about the unit costs of 
the lnforrnatlonnl functions as performed by specific team agents 
We have presented this summary of team theory only to make the 
foliowing points: that the relevance and usefulness of the abstract theory 
depend upon the possibility of computing realistic objective functions for 
alternative institutional arrangements of practical interest.  Moreover 
those possibilities cannot be even guessed a t  short of very particular real- 
izations of the abstract constructs of team theory. Consider, for exam- 
ple, the tradeoff between communication costs and the benefits associ- 
ated with better-informed decisions.. In our example, firms communicate 
summary measures of distributions describing what they know to the 
government, and governments communicate testing programs to firms. 
We suspect that  particular assumptions about the  costs of communicat- 
ing summary measures of the relevant distributions will be decisive: in 
any event t h s  can only be examined by computation in some particular 
examples. But team theory, thus specified, does give us a basis for seri- 
ous discussions of the merits of alternative arrangements in situations 
where information and communication costs are nontrivials, as they 
almost certainly are in the toxic chemicals testing case. Moreover we 
have a basis for testing the sensitivity of a computed ranking of alterna- 
tive institutional arrangements to assumptions about the quality of the 
prior information held by firms and by the government, and to assurnp- 
tions about the comparative advantages of flrms and the government in 
various kinds of testing. 
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